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CHANGING AMERICA: THREE
ARGUMENTS ABOUT ASIAN AMERICANS
AND THE LAW
FRANK H. WU*
INTRODUCTION
America is changing. Soon, people of color collectively will be the
racial majority, while whites as a group will find themselves racial
minorities like everyone else.' Already, only about three-quarters of
the United States population is Caucasian and non-Hispanic, to use
Census Bureau classifications. 2
This dramatic demographic shift is being produced by many factors,
among them: immigration, which has become a predominantly Asian
and Latino phenomena as the numbers of newcomers has increased
greatly;' intermarriage, which has risen among all racial groups
although there remains residual resistance to black-white unions;4
and the fluidity of identity, expressed recently by people declaring
their otherwise submerged Native-American heritage in response to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Howard University. J.D., University of Michigan; BA, Johns
Hopkins University. I would like to thank Dean Jamin Raskin of The American University.
Washington College of Law and the editors of the Law Review for inviting me to participate in
this conference. My thanks to Bob Chang and Andy Taslitz for their constructive criticism.
This Essay is a sequel of sorts to Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor Wite: Asian Americans and
Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 225 (1995).
1. SAM ROBERTS, WHO WE ARE: A PORTRAIT OF AMERICA BASED ON THE LATEST U.S.
CENSUS 67 (Rev. ed. 1995).
2. See id. (analyzing latest census figures).
3. Id. at 78.
4. Id. at 48, 115; seeRichard Morin, Unconventional Wisdom: New Facts and Hot Stats from the
Social Sciences, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,1995, at C5 (providing various statistics regarding interracial
relationships); see alsoAntonio McDaniel, The Dynamic Racial Composition of the United States: An
American Dilemma Revisited, DAEDULUS,Jan. 1995, at 179 (comparing intermarriage rates of Asian
Americans and African Americans, and concluding that rates are much higher for former than
latter).
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the popularity of the Disney movie, Pocahantas, a sharp, if quaint and
temporary, contrast to the tradition of "passing" as white.'
More than numbers, however, are changing. Significant economic,
political, and culture changes are occurring as well.
The concrete effects explain why there is no consensus on these
new realities and new images. For every person pleased with racial
diversity, someone else is displeased with cultural diversity. Whether
these changes are cause for celebration or for dismay, they can be
confusing and troubling.
Meanwhile, the law has proven ineffective in responding to the
facts. It is the rare case or statute that addresses the complexities of
multiple races and the contradictions of multi-culturalism. It is also
only recently that legal scholarship has turned to the issues created by
a diverse population.6 At a descriptive level, the racial realities must
be recognized, even if at a normative level, color-blindness is adopted
as the dominant principle. The presence of not only blacks, but also
Asians and Latinos, and more groups and also individuals formerly
relegated to the official status of "Other," suggests that color-blindness
is an all-the-less appropriate metaphor at the turn of the millennium.
It is important to consider groups and individuals who are neither
black nor white, not only for their own sake but also as a means of
better understanding of central black-white conflicts.
This Essay offers some tentative thoughts on what the many Asian
American experiences can contribute to the jurisprudence of race.7
It makes three independent but related arguments: (1) Asian
Americans demonstrate that color-blindness is a myth; (2) Asian
Americans show the dangers of applying social science in the law; and
(3) Asian Americans must become involved in the legal process. The
5. See Leef Smith, A Powhatan Princess in Their Past; Disney's Pocahontas Inspires Virginians to
Shake the Family Tree; WASH. Posr, July 13, 1995, at B1 (describing recent trend of asserting
Native American nationality).
6. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Ad-
dressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 863 (1993); Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging. The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REv. 303 (1993); see also Symposium, Race and Remedy in a Multi-Cultural Society, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 819 (1995).
7. For an articulation of an Asian American perspective on the law, see Robert S. Chang,
Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative
Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1243 (1993).
Two important articles on Asian Americans and the law are Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Wites"
in American Legal Histoy: A Review ofJustice at WaOr, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1186 (1985), and Neil
Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE
SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992). In both articles,
Professor Gotanda argues that Asian Americans have been cast in a citizen-foreigner paradigm
rather than a black-white paradigm.
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arguments share the common theme of examining Asian Americans
to test conventional notions about race and the law.
These arguments, of course, extend beyond Asian Americans, but
are developed here using them as an example. Each of these
arguments can and should be challenged and contested. Taken
together, they form another meta-argument-regardless of the
conclusions that are reached-that addressing race is imperative. Fail-
ure to discuss race exacerbates racism; it does not cure it.
I. JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALiA AND AUTHOR PETER BRIMELOW MEET
THE MODEL MINoIiY
In what will be a famous or an infamous passage, depending on the
course of later events, Justice Antonin Scalia, concurring in the result
but implicitly dissenting in the reasoning in the Supreme Court's
recent affirmative action case, wrote, "In the eyes of the government,
we are just one race here. It is American."8
This simple statement in dicta exemplifies the color-blind view in
contemporary constitutional discourse.' The color-blind philosophy
fails when it is tested against the Asian American experiences. Color-
blindness fails on all of its three conceptual levels with Asian
Americans. First, at the level of private beliefs, mainstream society
repeatedly refers to the race of Asian American individuals in making
judgments. Second, at the level of government action, the United
States has, in the past, relied on the race of Asians in establishing
public policy that disfavors them, and might well do so again. Third,
at the theoretical level, as a result of the racialized role of Asian
Americans as individuals and as a group, they cannot find a "neutral"
vantage point in race relations. These levels are analyzed in turn.
At the first level of private action, the myth of the model minority
reveals the myth of color-blindness. Criticism of the model minority
image of Asian Americans has become so familiar as to be taken for
granted by many of us. But every generation should be reminded of
the lies of the myth and their use for dubious purposes. The myth
might never be debunked, no matter how thorough or objective the
efforts to do so.
Anyone who studies Asian Americans knows about the model
minority myth. Since the arrival of Asian immigrants in the nine-
teenth century, and most notably since the 1960s, this ubiquitous
8. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,2119 (1995) (Scalia,J., concurring).
9. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind, "44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 30 (1991) (arguing that color-blindness is complex set of inconsistent arguments).
1996]
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superminority image has suggested that Asian Americans achieve
economic success and gain societal acceptance through conservative
values and hard work.
The image is a myth because Asian Americans have not achieved
economic success except in a superficial sense. Comparing equally
educated individuals, whites earn more money than Asian Ameri-
cans." Qualifications count less than race, in a pattern of regular
discrimination, not so-called "reverse" discrimination. The discrimina-
tion which Asian Americans in fact face can be reinforced by the
exaggerations of the myth. This reinforcement occurs, for example,
when non-Asian Americans believe that Asian Americans should be
subjected to maximum quotas in college admissions because they have
done too well and represent unfair competition.
Everyone should know that the model minority myth is deployed in
ways that expose the insincerity of its goodwill. The myth is used to
denigrate other racial minorities. It is used to ask African Americans,
rhetorically, "Well, the Asian Americans succeeded; why can't you?"
As the original New York Times article introducing the image put it,
Asian Americans stand in contrast to "problem minorities.""
Criticisms of the model minority myth based both on its empirical
bases and political uses have been made for more than a generation.
The critique of the model minority myth presents a case study in the
transition of ideas about race from academic circles to the popular
press. By 1980, there was a sizable scholarly literature disproving the
model minority myth. 2 By 1990, mass media articles had appeared,
initially opinion pieces, later news articles."8 Histories of Asian
Americans by Ronald Takaki, Sucheng Chan, and Roger Daniels
added authority to the arguments. 4
The critique of the model minority myth, disappointingly, also
offers an example of the failure of rational argument against racial
stereotyping. "Model minority myth" is a popular phrase, perhaps
10. See HERBERT R. BARRINGER ET AL, ASIANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS IN THE UNITED STATES
265-67 (1993) (reporting and analyzing conclusions of numerous comparative studies tending
to reject basis of model minority myth).
11. William Petersen, Success Sto: Japanese American Styie, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1966 (Maga-
zine), at 20 (introducing stereotype that Asian Americans have succeeded despite discrimina-
tion).
12. See Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor Wite: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C.
THIRD-WoRLD LJ. 225, 244-47 (1995) (citing various examples of current literature debunking
model minority myth).
13. See id. at 240 n.81 (listing representative articles criticizing model minority myth).
14. For comprehensive histories of Asian Americans tending to reject the model myth
minority, see generally SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY (1991);
ROGER DANIELS, CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850 (1988); RONALD
TAKAXI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS (1989).
814
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because of the alliteration. But the "model minority" is still empha-
sized over the "myth." Three examples confirm the continuing
strength of the stereotype. The controversial book The Bell Curvd5
places Asian Americans nominally at the top of its racial hierarchy of
intelligence quotient scores, which it argues effectively determines
socioeconomic status.16 The campaign against affirmative action
plays upon the supposed successes of Asian American students,
without making clear whether that success is to be copied or
feared. 7 Former presidential candidate and United States Senator
Phil Gramm, who is a Caucasian, looks at his wife Wendy Gramm,
who is an Asian American, as an embodiment of the model
minority.1
8
Yet, the model minority myth ought to self-destruct. After all, to be
able to see Asian Americans as a racial group, especially a racial group
which can be contrasted with other racial groups, requires a highly
developed sense of color-consciousness. If society was color-blind in
the sense of blotting out race and all references to race, it would be
impossible to point at Asian Americans, much less use them as an
example. Ironically, when Asian Americans are used to attack
affirmative action, the case for evaluating the merit of individuals
focuses on the supposed success of a racial group.
At the second level of government action, the new attacks on
immigration reveal the myth of color-blindness from a different angle.
The historical restrictionist approach to immigration is articulated in
the Supreme Court's late nineteenth century decisions upholding the
Chinese Exclusion. 9 In precedent that has never been explicitly
overruled, but, has repeatedly been expressly affirmed, the Court has
abdicated its role. ° It accepted the congressional finding that "the
15. RIcHARDJ. HERRNSTEIN &CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
16. Id. at 272-76,299-301 (explaining methodology for analyzing bell curve and significance
of each section of curve); see generally THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE
FUTURE OFAMERICA (Steven Fraser ed., 1995) (reprinting major articles analyzing TheBell Curve
including essays by Stephan jay Gould, Howard Gardner, Henry Louis Gates,Jr., Nathan Glazer,
Andrew Hacker, Randall Kennedy, Orlanda Patterson, and Thomas Sowell).
17. See Wu, supra note 12, at 238-39 (arguing that Asian Americans are admired for their
triumph over adversity and feared because they are becoming too enmeshed in successful Ameri-
can society).
18. See Ralph Z. Hallow, For '96 Race, Gramm Looks Hard to Beat, WASH. TIMES, Oct 6, 1993,
at A8 (describing Senator Gramm's staff memo recommending emphasis on Gramm's wife's
ethnicity, education, and occupation as "selling points").
19. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 704 (1893) (finding that exclusion of
Chinese laborers from United States was constitutional exercise of legislature's powers); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609-10 (1889) (same).
20. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712 (stating that after establishing Congress' unquestion-
able right to expel aliens, "it behooves the court to be careful that it does not undertake to pass
1996] 815
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presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not
assimilate with us, [is] dangerous to [the country's] peace and
security." " Since then, federal legislation in the immigration area
has moved steadily, if slowly, toward what might be termed race-
neutral standards, but recently a counter-reaction has emerged.
The modem restrictionist approach is presented by Peter Brimelow,
author of Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration
Disaster.2 Brimelow at least is honest enough to explain the racial
origins of his arguments. He writes, "Race and ethnicity are destiny
in American politics"23 and "[c]ulture is a substitute for ethnicity."24
According to Brimelow, "[t]he American nation of 1965, nearly 90
percent white, was explicitly promised that the new immigration
policy would not shift the country's racial balance. But it did."21
Therefore, "[iit is simply common sense that Americans have a
legitimate interest in their country's racial balance. '26 Indeed, white
Americans "have a right to insist that their government stop shift-
ing''27 the racial balance and they "have a right to insist that it be
shifted back."2' Brimelow also candidly suggests that the economic
basis for lowering immigration masks a more troubling set of
motivations. "People habitually justify their immigration preferences
in economic terms, but really they are motivated by a wide range of
ethnic, moral, and even psychological agendas."29
It is within the context of Brimelow's attacks on immigration that
current legislative proposals to reduce the level of immigration should
be interpreted. They are efforts to return a racial consciousness to an
area of the law which, because it has been characterized as part of
foreign relations rather than domestic politics, becomes a sphere
separate from civil rights. In immigration, a long line of Supreme
Court precedent has made clear that Congress can do what would be
forbidden elsewhere."0 Brimelow, and others like him, would urge
Congress to test the limits. Proposals that conspicuously omit race in
upon political questions").
21. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
22. PETER BRIMELOW, AuEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION
DISASTER (1995).
23. I. at xvii.
24. Id at 262.
25. Id at 188.
26. I& at xvi.
27. Id at 264.
28. Id.
29. Id. at xvii.
30. See, eg., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977) (upholding immigration statute that
discriminated on basis of gender and legitimacy in manner that concededly would be invalid as
applied to citizens).
816
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their text may well have racial concerns as their spirit. The movement
to close the borders to all immigration, legal and otherwise, may be
motivated as much by the numbers of immigrants as by their race and
their presumed culture. As a consequence, the "one race" of "Ameri-
cans" can be defined at its threshold in a manner that is racially
exclusive.
At the third level of theory, it is impossible to be neutral in race
relations. Everyone has a vested interest. Color-blindness has been
promoted as an idea of neutrality. Asian Americans sometimes have
been portrayed as living between black and white and, accordingly,
neutral. The most famous Asian American of late, Los Angeles Judge
Lance Ito, while presiding over the OJ. Simpson trial in 1994 and
1995, was described as "neutral" in the racialized "trial of the
century."31 Even Judge Ito could not maintain his "neutral" place
racially. Despite his judicial role and corresponding neutrality in the
symbolism of the trial process, and even though his racial status may
have seemed irrelevant, it became relevant to observers. One
revealing episode was Senator Alfonse D'Amato's appearance on a
radio show mid-way through the trial.3 2 In his remarks, Senator
D'Amato mocked Judge Ito as having a heavy Asian accent, later
explaining that he was using the racial reference as a means of
criticizing the conduct of the trial.33 Numerous other racial refer-
ences to Judge Ito and Asian American witnesses occurred within the
trial itself and in the extensive media coverage.'
It would be a cliche but for the denials, that for many people, race
remains important. Justice Scalia's facile remark that we are all
Americans effectively obscures the legal construction of that catego-
ry.35 Not everyone can become an American. Those people who
31. Joseph Mallia, Ito'sRightManforJob, BOSTON HERALD, OCt. 18,1994, atB3 (summarizing
Judge Ito's qualifications in presiding as judge in Simpson case).
32. SeeMelinda Hennenburger, D'Amato Gives a New Apology on Ito Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 1995, at Al (explaining context of remark by Senator D'Amato).
33. See Lawrence Van Gelder, D'Amato Mocks Ito and Sets OffFuror, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,1995,
at A4 (reporting Senator D'Amato's explanation concerning remarks aboutJudge Ito).
34. For an interesting discussion of the presentation 'of Asian Americans in the OJ.
Simpson trial, see forthcoming article by Cynthia Lee. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and the O.J.
Simpson Triab An Asian American Perspective; 6 HASTINs WOMENS' LJ. (forthcoming 1996).
In contrast to Senator D'Amato's description of Judge Lance Ito, essayist Stanley Crouch,
writing from an explicitly black perspective, characterized Chinese criminologist Henry Lee in
seemingly positive racial terms, as "the ghost of Charlie Chan... brought to life with a deeply
human three-dimensionality the Hollywood scriptwriters never achieved." Stanley Crouch, The
Good News, ESQUIRE, Dec. 1995, at 116.
35. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 1, 5 (1994) (asserting that mostjudges and
scholars accept common wisdom concerning race resulting in "racial etiquette," which effectively
ignores race as issue).
1996]
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cannot become Americans, regardless of their consent to the ideals
of the community, have been excluded in the past because of their
race and may again be excluded in the future because of their race.
Even as citizens, Asian Americans can be treated as outsiders to their
own society, as demonstrated most vividly by the wartime internment
decisions.3 6 Even as full members within their own society, Asian
Americans may be used as a model minority to criticize other racial
minorities. Throughout the spectrum of possibilities, race is relevant.
II. IF THE STEREOTYPE FITS, WEAR IT?
The recurring debate over the use of social science in the law has
concentrated on empirical data that has been used to reach results
that are "liberal," most notably in Brown v. Board of Education." The
latest version of this debate, which is only starting to become
apparent, will turn on empirical data that is used to reach results that
are "conservative," most likely arguments along the lines of "it can't
be racism if it's true." It is only a matter of time before politicians
seeking to rationalize official discrimination rely on The Bell Curve, or
parties involved in litigation defend private prejudice based on similar
studies.
With only rudimentary guidelines from the Supreme Court in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,"8 that strict scrutiny is not always
fatal, and that lower courts should consider "evidence," it is unclear
whether social science as a means will support liberal ends. In any
event, the model minority myth will be an important exhibit.
Needless to say, the model minority myth has some truth to it. There
is a credible and possibly persuasive argument that Asian American
family income is, on the average, higher than white family income. 9
Like all good social science, such data presents as many questions as
it provides answers. It is as problematic as it is polemic.
While one can respond to the critique of the model minority myth,
such a defense of the model minority myth rests on the assertion that
the myth is true. The response of descriptive truth fails to address a
threshold issue of normative truth: is it appropriate to use race as an
independent variable or the suspect classification with which to make
36. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (upholding constitutionality
of internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II), conviction vacated on writ of coram
nobis, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
37. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding that segregated
educational facilities were inherently unequal with some reliance on data showing social impact
of segregation).
38. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
39. See BARRiNGER, supra note 10, at 265-67.
HeinOnline  -- 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 818 1995-1996
AsAN AMERICANS AND THE LAW
generalizations and draw conclusions? The proponent of the model
minority myth implicitly must answer in the affirmative. But the data
should be placed within a context for legal purposes.
4 °
Specifically, the proponent of the model minority myth cannot
avoid answering other questions. Which comparisons are apt: family
income or individual income? Controlling for which other factors
among many: citizen/immigrant status, gender, education, language
skills, etc.? Overall, the proponent of the model minority myth also
should be directed toward addressing the purpose of using the model
minority myth-is it to attack affirmative action, or exclude Asian
Americans from affirmative action?
Aside from the model minority myth, there are other "facts" about
Asian Americans that may be considered as conundrums on this issue
of social science in the law. One fact in particular conforms to
stereotypes: it is true that today a majority of Asian Americans are
foreign-born.
Given the efforts to limit immigration, the foreign-born status of
most Asian Americans will attract attention to them, even to those
who are native-born citizens. If the majority of Asians in America are
immigrants, and some unsubstantiated claims about undocumented
immigration place it at a level equal to legal immigration, would that
then make it "reasonable" under a statute similar to Proposition
18742 in California, to "suspect" that they were also undocumented
immigrants?
These inquiries are meaningful if the law is to be purposive. In
order to respond meaningfully to these queries-to give legal signifi-
cance to the factual inquiries-the traditional test of invidious intent
is important in constitutional law.43 To the extent that the intent
40. See generally David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact Finding": Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interetation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (1991) (setting forth
comprehensive survey of Supreme Court cases that uses social science data); Charles L
Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racivn, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987) (proposing "cultural meaning" test for racial discrimination claims, which
would permit use of wide range of historical, psychological, and sociological interpretative
evidence).
41. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION:
1994, at 111 (1995).
Another fact that is contrary to stereotype but conforms to mainstream behavior is that most
Asian Americans who reveal a religious preference are adherents of Western faiths, not Eastern
faiths. See Ari L. Goldman, Portrait of Rdigion in U.S. Holds Dozens of Surprises, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 1991, at Al (reporting that Asian Americans are religiously assimilated).
42. For the amendments made by Proposition 187, establishing the standard of reasonable
suspicion, see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.65 (West 1994); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(C)
(West 1994); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5(c) (West 1994).
43. See, e-g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (finding that in order to
establish discrimination in jury selection process, plaintiff must not only prove discriminatory
19961
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test may be divisive, requiring that a wrongdoer be identified, or that
it may be inadequate, because of unconscious bias, it should be
replaced by an approach that can weigh in the balance more than
merely statistical data. None of this is to suggest that social science
be disregarded.
The risks of relying on social science are well worth taking. The
danger, however, is that courts will rely on empirical evidence without
addressing the contested nature of the proof and the context in
which it is generated. The courts must be willing to make normative
judgments.' Otherwise, a Panglossian world will be the result, with
what is becoming confused with what should be.
III. RACE REFLECTED IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
Procedure reproduces substance. The tendency to view race as
breaking down neatly along black and whites lines is reinforced by the
traditional model of litigation as between two parties. A generation
ago, Professor Abraham Chayes published the pathbreaking article,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.45 He argued that many
cases could no longer be conceived of as purely private disputes be-
tween a pair of adversaries, but instead should be seen as having a
significant public impact involving multiple parties. 46
Despite the influence of the Chayes article on structural litigation,
only a few of the major desegregation cases have involved repre-
sentatives of all racial groups4--never mind the additional problem
of ensuring that each representative, in fact, speaks for whom he
purports to represent, legally and as well as literally.48 Typically,
there is a named plaintiff of a racial minority group, say, blacks, who
represents, in a formal sense, either all people of color, or only that
impact but must also prove invidious intent that race was reason that jurors were excluded);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (requiring
proof of racially discriminatory intent in equal protection challenge to town's zoning plan);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976) (stating that disparate impact alone will not make
law unconstitutional without proof of racially discriminatory purpose).
44. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Themes, 89 YALE LJ. 1063 (1980) (arguing that substantive principles are necessary for con-
stitutional themes).
45. Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976) (analyzing theories of various types of litigation).
46. Id. at 1286.
47. See Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973) (deciding school desegregation case
involving tripartite school system with separate institutions for African Americans, Latinos, and
whites).
48. See Derrick A. Bell, Serwing Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470, 476 (1976) (noting that, in racial desegregation
litigation, named plaintiffs and their counsel are not adequately representative of minorities for
whom they are speaking).
820
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specific group, suing a defendant entity that represents in some sense
the white majority or white decisionmakers. Asian Americans, less
than individual blacks, cannot always depend on formal representa-
tion in the litigation. Asian Americans, less than most whites, also
cannot depend on the presumed representation in the underlying
political process. As much as whites may object to a consent decree
to which they are not a party,49 or other result reached in public law
litigation, all the more so may Asian Americans have cause to
complain that they are excluded.
Whether the courts can function within the Chayes model will be
tested by the Lowell High School case, filed in 1994 in San Francisco,
California.5" In one of the most diverse cities in the nation, where
the largest racial minority group are Asian Americans, a group of
Chinese Americans filed a challenge to the school desegregation
consent decree.-" They argued that their rights to equal protection
were violated by admissions standards to Lowell High School, the
flagship of the district, which required that Chinese Americans score
higher than everyone else, including whites, to gain admission.
52
The Lowell case arises as much from civil procedure problems as it
does from substantive equal protection doctrine. It raises, acutely,
issues about the importance of representation in structural litigation
and the potential for unanticipated collateral attacks on consent
decrees. Whatever its outcome on the merits, this challenge should
signal the end of racial bipolarity in. civil procedure.
49. SeeMartin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that nonparties to consent decree may
bring collateral challenges).
50. See Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Cal. Case No. C-94-2418
WHO, Memorandum Decision and Order, Sept. 28, 1995 (denying motions to dismiss and
rejecting argument that plaintiffs were adequately represented in earlier litigation) (order
marked "DO NOT PUBLISH OR INCLUDE IN DATABASE" (on file with author); see also Selena
Dong, "Too Many Asians:" The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian Americans and
Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (1995) (tracing case of public school
employing admission policy, resulting from 1993 consent decree, that required raised admission
standards for Chinese applicants). The Martin case and Lowell High School case are different
because Asian Americans cannot be characterized as even constructively represented by the
original defendants to the litigation.
51. SeeVenise Wagner, San Francisco Sued over School Admissions Quotas, S.F. ExAMINER,July
11, 1994, atAl (reporting that suit against school district was based on assertions that consent
decree's racial caps were unconstitutional).
52. See Dong, supra note 50, at 1030 (stating that because desegregation consent decree
required each school in district to enroll students from at least four of nine specified
ethnic/racial groups, no one group could constitute more than 40% of total enrollment).
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CONCLUSION
The American dilemma is no longer an apt term.53 There is the
old American dilemma of black-white race relations, but it has been
joined by the new American dilemmas of multiple race relations,
many disputes among even more contending groups, and still without
a consensus on basic principles or guiding visions. It is too late to be
optimistic, but too early to be pessimistic.
53. With apologies to Gunnar Myrdal.
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